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Abstract This paper investigates the effect of recent regulatory changes to 
the compulsory annuitisation of tax-privileged pension savings, on the 
demand for annuities and other retirement products. We find that the 
demand for annuities has fallen by almost seventy-five percent from its 
peak in 2012, and the demand for income drawdown products has increased. 
There is some evidence that people at younger ages and with smaller 
pension pots are choosing not to annuitise, and hence the average size of an 
annuity purchase has increased. 
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I. Introduction 
Until 2011 it was effectively compulsory for most individuals in the UK with a 
defined-contribution (DC) pension to buy an annuity in retirement. This 
annuitisation requirement, in place since 1956, was removed in two separate 
stages and in this paper we use data provided by the Association of British 
Insurers (ABI) to analyse the effects on annuity sales of both policy changes. 
Both the Conservative and Liberal Democrat election manifestos had proposed 
changing the annuity requirement and the Coalition’s June 2010 Budget 
announced a consultation on how to implement the change. The removal of the 
requirement to annuitise, subject to a minimum income requirement (MIR) of a 
minimum total pension income of £20,000, was announced in the March 2011 
Budget and came into effect in April 2011. Despite this relaxation of the 
annuitisation requirement, the presence of the MIR meant that most individuals 
continued to have little option other than buy an annuity or do nothing with 
their pension, since the alternative of income drawdown (a type of phased 
withdrawal) was considered suitable only for the wealthy (due to high costs). 
The second change occurred in the March 2014 Budget, when the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer made the surprise announcement that the rules on accessing DC 
pensions would be much more flexible, declaring “no-one will have to buy an 
annuity”. Although the policy only formally came into effect in April 2015, 
transitional arrangements and the existing ability to delay annuitisation meant 
that most pensioners were able to change their annuitisation decisions almost 
immediately.  
Despite theoretical arguments that the welfare benefits of annuitisation are large 
(Yaari, 1965), voluntary annuitisation is rare and many pensioners hold a high 
proportion of their wealth in non-annuitised form, a phenomenon known as the 
“annuity puzzle” (Brown, 2001): consequently annuity markets tend to be large 
only when annuitisation is compulsory. Inkmann, Lopes and Michaelides (2011) 
examine the determinants of voluntary annuity demand in the UK, using a 
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sample of 5,233 retired persons from English Longitudinal Study of Ageing 
(ELSA) panel dataset for two waves: 2002/3 and 2004/05. They find that only 4% 
of the initial sample voluntarily purchased annuities (5.9% in 04/05), which is 
confirmation of an annuity puzzle in the UK.  
Cannon and Tonks (2008) explain that the annuity puzzle could be due to a range 
of factors. Although low annuity rates could potentially explain low demand, 
Cannon and Tonks (2011) and Cannon and Tonks (2013) demonstrate that 
money’s worth values are high in both the voluntary and compulsory annuity 
markets, and the utility value of insurance exceeds any load factors or transaction 
costs. Alternative explanations for avoiding annuitisation include: bequest 
motives; health and long-term care costs in old-age; the existence of pre-
annuitised wealth via the state pension; the effect of means-tested benefits; the 
option value of deferral of annuitisation to later ages; selection effects; and 
alternative optimal decumulation strategies.  
Despite the likely importance of these factors, there remain unanswered 
questions about annuitisation in the UK compulsory market. Within this market, 
pensioners who strongly desired to avoid annuitisation could defer annuitisation 
until 75 and although deferring annuitisation would not address all of the issues 
listed in the previous paragraph, as we shall see, it is surprising that virtually no 
pensioners chose this option. One possible explanation for this is that the 
annuity puzzle is partly due to behavioural reasons, i.e., behaviour is influenced 
by psychological biases such as framing effects.1 
If framing effects are important the effect of removing compulsion from an 
annuity market is ambiguous, since agents may anchor their behaviour to 
                                                 
1 Agnew, Anderson, Gerlach and Szykman (2008) report on an experimental investigation into 
the role of framing with respect to the annuitisation decision. FCA (2014) reports a similar 
framing experiment, and found that there was something about the word ‘annuity’ that 
deterred purchases despite the same people wanting longevity insurance. It appears that the 
product, or at least the word, is unpopular. 
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previous expectations. Furthermore, because compulsion in the UK has resulted 
in a large market, there are a much wider range of annuity products than can be 
found in other countries, such as enhanced annuities for pensioners with poor 
health. Hitherto the only annuity market to have a major change in policy is in 
Australia, where the removal of incentives to annuitise led to the annuity market 
virtually disappearing (Bateman and Piggott, 2011). Although the correlation 
between compulsion and high annuitisation rates is almost certainly causal, the 
UK policy changes provide an opportunity both to test this and to see the 
magnitude of the effect of removing compulsion on a large and mature annuity 
market.  
The UK was unusual in having a policy of compulsory annuitisation, and various 
international commentators had commented on the benefits relative to the costs 
of this policy (Poterba, 2001; Yermo, 2001). Arguments in support of compulsory 
annuitisation are that it protects the state against moral hazard and individuals 
against myopia; it reduces (adverse) selection problems ensuring a large efficient 
market; and it reflects the tax advantages given to pension savings during the 
accumulation phase of a pension. There is also a tendency for compulsory 
annuitisation to redistribute wealth away from the poor (short-livers) to the rich 
(long-livers), although the presence of an enhanced annuity market for 
pensioners with ill health allows short-livers to separate themselves from the 
long-livers.  
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA, 2016) has undertaken an initial 
investigation into the effect of the 2015 changes on the market for retirement 
products. From a survey of 95 pension providers between July to September 2015 
they report that 178,990 pensions have been accessed by consumers either taking 
an income or fully withdraw their money as cash. Of these, 34% used a cash lump 
sum, 30% used income drawdown, 13% purchased an annuity and 23% were small 
pot full withdrawals. 
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The next section describes the UK annuity market and details the policy changes 
of 2010/11 and 2014/15.  Section III provides a list of research questions, and the 
data provided by the ABI are described in Section IV. We report our findings in 
Section V, and the final section provides some initial conclusions, and outlines 
future research questions. 
II. Institutional Background and the Recent Reforms  
Despite slight modifications in details, from 1956 the general principle of UK 
pension policy was that pension wealth accumulated in a personal pension 
should be annuitised at retirement. A consequence of this is that the UK has two 
separate annuity markets: the lifetime annuity market, until 2014 commonly 
known as the compulsory purchase annuity (CPA) market, where individuals 
who had accumulated a defined contribution pension fund through tax-
advantaged contributions were required to convert their pension fund into an 
annuity (less a 25% tax-free lump sum); and a voluntary annuity market 
(purchased-life annuity, PLA) where individuals can convert any savings into a 
life annuity. The income streams in these two markets are taxed differently, with 
income in the CPA market being taxed at marginal rates (on the basis that these 
savings had previously benefited from tax deductibility on contributions and no 
tax on re-invested savings2), but annuity income in the PLA benefits from no tax 
on the run down in capital. 
Even before the policy changes of 2010/11 and 2014/15, there were a variety of 
exceptions to the annuitisation requirement. As already noted, it was possible to 
take 25% of pension wealth as a tax-free lump sum: furthermore annuitisation 
could be deferred until age 75. It was also possible to avoid annuitisation if an 
individual personal pension fund was sufficiently small (the “small pots” 
                                                 
2 Surveying different countries’ pension systems,  Dilnot and Johnson (1994) and Antolín, Pugh 
and Stewart (2008) show that this exempt-exempt-taxed (EET) model is the most common tax 
system  
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exemption) or total pension wealth was sufficiently small (“trivial 
commutation”).3 
Income drawdown (or “unsecured income”) has been allowed as an alternative 
to annuitisation since 1994, although the Financial Services Authority 
recommended these products only for individuals with relatively large pension 
pots.4 Until 2011, each year a pensioner in drawdown could withdraw a 
proportion of their funds up to a limit set by the Government, designed to mirror 
annuity rates (120% of the ‘relevant annuity’ or ‘GAD rate’ (provided by the 
Government Actuary’s Department tables).  At 75 the pensioner had to switch to 
an annuity (“secured income”) or “alternatively secured income” of up to 90% of 
the GAD rates. On death before 75, remaining funds could be repaid as a capital 
sum, subject to tax of 35 per cent, or transferred to a pension for a dependant.  
The major component of the 2010/11 reforms was to remove the compulsory 
annuitisation requirements for those individuals who could demonstrate that 
they had sufficient pension income to satisfy the minimum income requirement 
of £20,000 per annum (Blake, Cannon and Tonks, 2010): the precise definition of 
what counted as income and the precise minimum were only announced in April 
2011. Other changes from April 2011 were the relaxation of the minimum level of 
withdrawals, making the maximum level of withdrawals the same for those above 
and below age 75, and an increase in the tax charge on the remaining capital sum 
on death. 
                                                 
3 Unless an individual suffered poor health, it was impossible to access pension wealth through 
annuitisation until age 50, rising to age 55 in 2012. We discuss this issue in the online appendix. 
4 The FSA (2009) MoneyMadeClear Guidelines on income withdrawal and the FSA (2010) guide 
to pension annuities emphasised that “Income withdrawal plans are complex and not suitable for 
everyone, for example if you have a small pension fund and no other assets or income to fall back 
on” (April, 2010). Earlier versions of the FSA guides to pension annuities recommended that 
“Income withdrawal involves extra costs and extra investment risk compared with buying an 
annuity straight away. For this reason, it is usually suitable only if you have a pension fund of over 
£100,000 (after taking any lump sum) or you have other assets and sources of income to fall back 
on” (FSA, 2004). 
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An important distinction is made in the UK between “advice” (which can only be 
supplied by someone with appropriate qualifications and who bears some 
liability for failing to advise correctly) and “guidance”, which simply provides 
generic information. A key regulatory change emphasised in KPMG (2015) is the 
FSA’s Retail Distribution Review implemented in January 2013 which has meant 
that financial advice must be paid for by a fee agreed by the customer rather than 
commission paid by the provider, which has had the effect of financial advisors 
concentrating on the wealthier end of the consumer distribution. The 
implication is that individuals with small pension pots may be making decisions 
with insufficient information. 
The Budget of 19 March 2014 included the surprise abolition of the annuitisation 
requirement (HM Treasury, 2014). These reforms to be enacted after 6th April 
2015 had two components. First, individuals would be able to access their pension 
wealth as a cash withdrawal subject to marginal tax rates (which acts as a strong 
disincentive to withdraw all of the pension wealth as cash in one go) from the 
age of 55, along with fewer restrictions on annuities and no restrictions on 
income drawdown. Second, individuals would be entitled to free pension 
guidance.5  
A third measure was the immediate introduction of a transitional regime for 
2014/15, allowing more flexibility in income drawdown, and increasing the limits 
on trivial commutation and small pot payments respectively from £18,000 to 
£30,000, and £2,000 to £10,000 from 27th March 2014.6  
                                                 
5 In the appendix we provide some evidence of the effect of the 2014/15 change on the uptake of 
financial advice. 
6 In addition these transitional arrangements: i) increased the maximum income allowed to be 
taken from drawdown from 120% to 150% of the rate set by the Government Actuary’s 
Department; and ii) decreased the Minimum Income Requirement from other sources to qualify 
for flexible drawdown from £20,000 to £12,000.  
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III. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Individuals with DC pension pots have a choice of four alternatives when 
deciding how to access their pension wealth:  (i) purchase an annuity; (ii) set up 
an income drawdown scheme; (iii) withdraw some or all of the pension pot as 
cash and incur any tax consequences; or (iv) defer, and leave the pension pot 
invested.  Our data allow us to measure the effect of both the 2010/11 and 2014/15 
reforms on the sales of annuities and income drawdown products. In both cases 
we can observe changes in the number and value of contracts sold and hence the 
average size of annuity purchased. We would anticipate that the effect of the 
reforms will be for the demand for annuities to fall, both by total value and 
number of policies sold, but the extent of the fall will be an empirical question.  
Increased limits on trivial commutation and small pots rules, particularly during 
the transition period in 2014, are likely to affect the lower end of the annuity 
market more and so we also look at the distribution of annuity purchase sizes, 
anticipating that the average size of an annuity purchase will rise. 
If some consumers had previously been using drawdown to escape annuitisation 
then the 2014 reforms should have reduced the demand for drawdown. On the 
other hand, these schemes have the advantage of offering the potential for 
growth of pension wealth, particularly when combined with expected increased 
future (health-related) costs; they allow for bequest motives; they provide 
flexibility, if individuals have not decided how to access their pension, or wish to 
defer annuitising. There also may be a temporary effect on drawdown caused by 
the needs of individuals to access a portion of their pension wealth during a 
transitional phase in which pension providers set up procedures for allowing 
savers to access their pension wealth. 
We also examine the effect of the reforms on the age distribution of annuity sales. 
The major change in policy was the increase in the minimum pension age from 
50 to 55 in April 2010, and the minimum age for trivial commutation / small pot 
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rules was reduced to 55 from 60 in April 2015. As a consequence of these changes 
we would expect to see more sensitivity to the reforms at younger ages. 
We are also interested in examining the effect of the reforms on different types 
of annuity product. The UK has a significant market for “enhanced” annuities, 
offering better rates to individuals with poor health (and lower life expectancy) 
and it was predicted that the reforms would result in the collapse of the enhanced 
annuity market, since unhealthy individuals would prefer cash to an annuity.7   
IV. Data 
We have quarterly data on annuity and income drawdown sales by annuity 
providers who provide data returns to the ABI. These data are collected by the 
ABI from two quarterly surveys of insurance company sales, which are each then 
aggregated across annuity providers: the data cover virtually all of the annuity 
market and a large part of the drawdown market.8 
The first dataset is the ABI’s Quarterly Long-Term Business (QLB) survey, which 
includes overall sales and values for a variety of products for 2007:Q1 - 2015:Q3. 
These are broken down into internal and external sales, with some information 
on annuity type and distribution channel. Over time the data collected has 
become more detailed which means that some of the most detailed breakdowns 
are not available before the policy changes that we wish to analyse. The other 
dataset is the ABI’s Quarterly Pension Annuity (QPA) survey, which includes 
sales broken down by age and fund size in different size bands for 2009:Q1 - 
2015:Q3. As with the QLB data, further breakdowns of type of annuity have been 
                                                 
7 Although all life assurers suffered a negative share price reaction to the announcement of the 
abolition of compulsory annuitisation. Just Retirement plc and Partnership Assurance which 
specialised in enhanced annuities were particularly hard hit. 
8 We do not have data on annuity rates. Since most providers price by postcode (to allow for 
geographical variations in life expectancy), collecting the full menu of prices across the UK is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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recorded in the most recent quarters, but are not available before the policy 
changes. 
The QPA data are split by size of the annuity purchase and by age of the 
annuitant. These data also provide information on whether the annuity is 
purchased internally from the customer’s existing pension provider or externally 
from a different annuity provider; furthermore we can identify sales of enhanced 
annuities, which offer better rates to individuals with poor health. 
V. Results 
We initially examine the effect of the policy changes on the annuity market as a 
whole. Figure 1, panel A, shows the growth in sales of annuities by value over the 
period up to 2013, and the subsequent decline. The decline in annuity sales 
immediately after the 2010 announcement was not large relative to the quarter-
on-quarter fluctuation in sales.  Annuity premiums peaked in the last quarter of 
2012 with quarterly sales worth over £3.8 billion and declined dramatically since 
early 2014 following the announcement of the abolition of compulsion. By 2015, 
the value of quarterly annuity sales averaged about £1 billion, only a quarter of 
the peak in sales, two years earlier.  
[INSERT Figure 1 here] 
The figure also shows the value of income drawdown contracts, which in part 
mirrors the patterns in annuity sales. There was little obvious trend in total 
drawdown purchases up until 2014, but an increase since the most recent 
reforms, suggesting that some but not all individuals substituted drawdown for 
annuitisation.  
[INSERT Table 1 here] 
Table 1 quantifies the effect of the changes to the annuitisation rules illustrated 
in Figure 1: we report the average quarterly premiums, sales and mean purchase 
before the changes and then the effect of the changes in 2010/11 and 2014/15. To 
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do this we have to take a position on when to date the changes. We date the first 
change to 2011:Q2, since there were no transitional arrangements between 2010 
and 2011 and it was not even clear what the policy would be until March 2011. We 
date the second policy change to 2014:Q2: although the policy change was only 
formally effected in 2015, the presence of transitional arrangements meant that 
annuitants could respond almost immediately. In each column the numbers are 
calculated by a simple regression of the form 
(1) 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷2 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
where 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 is the variable of interest; 𝐷𝐷1 is a step dummy equal to zero up to 2011:Q1 
and one from 2011:Q2 onwards; and analogously 𝐷𝐷2 is a step dummy taking the 
value one from 2014:Q2 onwards. Given the small number of quarterly 
observations, we have not attempted a more fine-grained analysis of the changes. 
For example, in column (3) the constant term shows that quarterly annuity 
premiums averaged £2.77 billion from 2007:Q1 to 2011:Q1, whereas column (4) 
shows that drawdown premiums averaged £576 million. Confirming that income 
drawdown was predominantly used by the wealthy, the average size of pension 
wealth converted into an annuity was £25,020, but for drawdown was £80,450 
(columns 5 and 6). 
The coefficients on the dummy variables quantify the changes illustrated in 
Figure 1:  with annuity premiums fell by £1.8 billion, and drawdown sales more 
than doubling with an increase of £651 million. The effect of the 2011 reforms were 
relatively small with a fall in annuity sales of nearly fifteen thousand contracts 
per quarter, but an increase in annuity premiums of £308 million and a fall in 
drawdown contracts and premiums of £213 million.  
Panel B of Figure 1 and columns (5) and (6) of Table 1 show that the average value 
of annuity contracts sold increased after 2011 and then again after 2014, with a 
small fall in the average size of drawdown products. To explore this further we 
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show the shares of annuity purchases of different sizes in Figure 2.9  The numbers 
of annuities purchased with premiums of up to £39,999 was declining gradually 
even before 2014, with purchases of other premium sizes approximately flat, but 
after 2014 there were substantial falls in annuity purchases of premium sizes up 
to £99,999, with the largest proportionate fall for the smallest purchases, as 
illustrated in Figure 2 by the log scale on the vertical axis. The number of annuity 
purchases with the largest premiums seems unaffected by the 2014/15 reforms, 
but the absolute numbers are tiny. 
[INSERT Figure 2 here] 
There has been a substantial drop in annuity purchases at the lower end of the 
market for small pension pots from 2010: yet the Minimum Income Requirement 
introduced in 2011 would have suggested that it was more likely to be the upper 
end of the size distribution that would have been affected by the 2010 changes. 
This may be explained by the ability to access pots of less than £2,000 from 2012, 
although, the evidence for this is not strong as the change was gradual. Other 
explanations may include greater awareness of the ability to consolidate pots and 
ease in doing so, an increase in the number of people with small pots leaving 
them untouched, or simply fund growth.  
Table 2 reports the coefficients from regressions of the form in equation (1) where 
the explained variable is the logarithm of sales: we approximate the 
proportionate fall with 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒�?̂?𝛽� − 1. 
[INSERT Table 2 here] 
                                                 
9 An individual may have more than one annuity contract, but we cannot observe that in our 
data. 
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The number of policies purchased for less than £5,000 fell by 32% after the 2011 
change and a further 81% after the 2014 announcement, consistent with the 
increase in March 2014 the limits for trivial commutations and small pots. 
[INSERT Figure 3 here] 
Panel A in Figure 3 shows the distribution of number of annuity contracts by the 
age at which the annuitant annuitised their pension wealth before and after each 
set of changes. Even when annuitisation was compulsory, it was only ever 
compulsory to annuitise by age 75, yet the figure illustrates the slightly puzzling 
feature throughout the entire period of analysis that the vast majority of 
annuities were purchased at ages 60 and 65. This reflects three related trigger 
points for annuitisation: (i) the State Pension Age; ii) the default retirement age 
operated until recently by employers; and iii) most individuals’ intended 
retirement date from their pension contract/scheme. These trigger points 
illustrate the importance of framing effects in annuity demand (Mitchell and 
Utkus, 2004). 
Panel B of Figure 3 shows the number of annuity contracts purchased over time 
for the most important ages of 55, 60, 65, and 70. The relative number of 
annuities sold to 60-year olds and 65-year olds have changed in two significant 
ways: first, the number of annuity sales to 60-year olds has fallen proportionately 
by much more than annuity sales to 65-year olds (at the beginning of the period 
sales to the two ages were similar, but by the end of the period there were about 
twice as many sales to 65-year olds as to 60-year olds); second, the decline in 
annuity sales to 60-year olds started around the time of the 2010/11 change, 
during a period when annuity sales to 65-year olds were still rising. The 
continued high level of sales at 65 may be explained by individuals with 
guaranteed annuity rates in their pension contracts continuing to take advantage 
of them: these are often only available at the intended retirement date in the 
contract, and typically pay a much higher income than current market rates. The 
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number of sales to 55-year olds was affected by the increase in the minimum 
annuitisation age to 55 in 2010:Q2 (which we discuss further in the appendix). 
 Finally, we note that the 2014/15 changes seem to have attenuated the growth of 
the market for enhanced annuities: this had grown from about a tenth to a third 
of the whole market in the period up to 2014, but remained constant or fell 
slightly thereafter (details in the appendix).  
VI. Conclusions 
The reforms to the compulsory annuitisation requirements of DC funds in 2010/11 
and especially 2014/15 have had a dramatic effect on the demand for annuities. 
The initial evidence is that the demand for annuities has fallen by seventy five 
percent from its peak in 2012. It appears that the average size of an annuity 
purchase has increased due to people at younger ages and with smaller pension 
pots choosing not to annuitise.  The implication is that the reforms to the small 
pots rules, and raising the threshold on the commutation of pension wealth has 
had the most significant effect on the decline in annuitisation. The demand for 
income drawdown products has increased, and the average size of a drawdown 
contract has fallen, although it is unclear whether this is a temporary 
phenomenon, as individuals establish mechanisms for accessing their pension 
wealth.  
There are trigger points at the ages at which individuals choose to access their 
pension wealth: with bunching of annuitisation at ages of 60 and 65. The reforms 
have not had a major impact on these trigger points. The market for enhanced 
annuities has declined along with all annuity sales, but the market share of 
enhanced annuities has remained roughly constant since the 2014/15 reforms. 
One of the intentions of these reforms was that the increased flexibility would 
act as an incentive to save for retirement. Future work will focus on the effect of 
the annuitisation reforms on the demand for DC pensions.  
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Figure 1: Total and Mean Value of Annuity and Drawdown Sales 
 
Panel A      Panel B 
 
Panel A shows the total value of annuity and income drawdown contracts sold (£millions) and 
Panel B shows the average size of annuity/drawdown purchases (£000s) in each quarter 2007 to 
2015. The vertical lines in the figures identify the quarter in which the changes to annuitisation 
rules were announced, and the quarter in which these changes became effective. Data from QLB 
survey. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Annuity Sales by Size of Annuity Purchase 
 
Figure shows quarterly annuity sales by the amount of the pension wealth being converted into 
an annuity: note the vertical logarithmic scale. Data from QPA survey. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Annuity Sales by Age 
Panel A      Panel B 
 
Panel A shows distribution of number of annuity contracts (000s) by the age at which the 
annuitant annuitised their pension wealth, decomposed into four different time periods: pre-
2010, 2010/2011, 2012/2013, 2014/2015. Panel B shows the number of annuity contract purchased 
over time for age cohorts: 55, 60, 65, and 70. Data from QPA survey. 
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Table 1: Changes in Sales of Pension Annuities and Drawdown 
 Number of contracts 
(thou) 
Total premiums (£m) Average premium (£thou) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Annuities Drawdown Annuities Drawdown Annuities Drawdown 
Quarterly average, 2007.Q1 
- 2011.Q1 
111.04*** 7.11*** 2769.63*** 576.36*** 25.02*** 80.45*** 
 (2.41) (0.64) (74.30) (43.76) (0.87) (2.08) 
Change in quarterly 
average after 2011:Q2 
-14.86*** -2.22* 307.73* -213.19** 7.06*** -7.00* 
 (3.75) (0.99) (115.51) (68.02) (1.36) (3.24) 
Further change in quarterly 
average after 2014:Q2 
-66.88*** 9.87*** -1807.92*** 651.21*** 13.35*** -3.06 
 (4.98) (1.32) (153.18) (90.20) (1.80) (4.30) 
N 35 35 35 35 35 35 
r2 0.90 0.64 0.82 0.62 0.82 0.20 
Averages calculated from PBL database. Standard errors of the mean quarterly averages in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Nb Figure 1 shows that 
the reforms represented a structural change in the annuities and drawdown markets, and the use of previous data to construct standard errors is problematic.  
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Table 2: Changes in Sales of Pension Annuities by Size of Contract 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 < £5,000 £5,000 to 
£39,999 
£40,000 to 
£99,999 
£100,000 to 
£249,999 
£250,000 and 
above 
Policy change 2011:Q2 -.382* -.147 .201** .237** -.152 
 (.137) (.0925) (.0685) (.0718) (.0893) 
 -32% -14% 22% 27% -14% 
Policy announcement 
2014:Q2 
-1.66*** -1.28*** -.928*** -.716*** -1.22*** 
 (.155) (.105) (.0776) (.0814) (.101) 
 -81% -72% -60% -51% -70% 
Constant 10.6*** 10.8*** 9.62*** 8.28*** 11.6*** 
 (.103) (.0699) (.0518) (.0543) (.0675) 
N 27 27 27 27 27 
r2 .876 .89 .859 .763 .889 
Dependent variable is the log of the number of policies purchased. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 The figures in red approximately 
convert the regression coefficients to percentage falls (= exp(betahat) - 1). 
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